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Summary
• Civilians in need frequently find themselves in the effective control of non-state armed 
groups (NSAGs) that are designated under sanctions and counterterrorism measures, including 
in contexts identified as at risk of famine. The prohibitions in these instruments on providing 
funds or other assets directly or indirectly to such groups are framed extremely broadly, and can 
potentially include incidental payments that humanitarian actions may need to make in order to 
operate or relief supplies that are diverted to such groups or that otherwise benefit them.
• The inclusion of exemption clauses for humanitarian action in sanctions regimes is the 
most effective way of ensuring that humanitarian operations do not violate such prohibitions. 
At present, however, only one conflict-related UN Security Council sanctions regime includes 
such an exemption. Enhancing awareness of the problem is key. A series of steps is suggested 
in this paper for systematically gathering information on the adverse impact of sanctions 
on humanitarian action and bringing it to the attention of Security Council members as 
well as the broader UN membership.
• Similarly, the inclusion of exceptions for humanitarian action would be the most effective 
solution with regard to prohibitions on providing material support in counterterrorism 
measures. It is unlikely that international instruments such as the 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, or UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 will be amended in this way. Progress is more likely to occur at the 
national level.
• Recently, some autonomous EU sanctions and counterterrorism measures have been adjusted 
to exclude humanitarian action from the scope of the prohibitions. The EU’s approach to this 
issue has received less attention than that of the Security Council but warrants further research, 
and constructive engagement between member states, the EU and humanitarian actors 
should continue.
• Banks must comply with the same prohibitions. To minimize the risk of liability, many 
have significantly limited the services they offer to humanitarian actors operating in 
contexts perceived as ‘high risk’. The impact of these restrictions is so significant that some 
humanitarian actors have noted that banks are effectively dictating where they can operate. 
For the restrictions to be reduced, humanitarian organizations should invest the time to build 
their relationships with their banks to assist them to develop specialist knowledge of the 
humanitarian sector, its business model and its approach to risk mitigation.
• States must also play a far more active role in relation to banking sector restrictions at the 
national and international level. In their capacity as donors, they could engage directly with 
the banking sector to explain the programmes they fund, and the requirements they include 
in funding agreements to reduce the risk of diversion or abuse. States with an interest in 
humanitarian action and with influence in the financial world should initiate a discussion 
among peers to consider creative cooperative solutions, such as approved ‘safe channels’, 
recognized by a number of states, for transmitting funds.
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1. Introduction
The problem
In 2010 famine was looming in parts of southern Somalia, including in areas under al-Shabaab 
control. Despite the severity of the civilian population’s needs, some humanitarian organizations 
were concerned that while providing life-saving assistance they might violate the prohibition on 
providing funds and other assets imposed against al-Shabaab in UN Security Council sanctions and 
US law. Eventually, the Security Council adopted an exemption clarifying that the prohibition did 
not extend to support that may be provided in the course of humanitarian assistance operations.1
This was an extreme example of the problems that can arise when civilians in need find 
themselves under the effective control of a non-state armed group (NSAG) designated under 
sanctions or counterterrorism measures that prohibit funds and other assets from directly 
or indirectly benefiting such groups.
These prohibitions are framed extremely broadly, and can potentially include relief supplies that are 
diverted to such groups or that otherwise benefit them; and incidental payments that humanitarian 
actors must make to be able to operate. Restrictions with similar effects are also frequently included 
in states’ funding agreements. Private actors, including the banking sector, must also comply with 
the sanctions and counterterrorism measures. To minimize the risk of liability, banks have imposed 
restrictions on the services they offer to humanitarian actors for operations in countries perceived 
as ‘high risk’. Overlooked until fairly recently, these restrictions are having a significant impact 
on the capacity of humanitarian actors to operate in certain contexts.
At present, civilians in need find themselves under the control of designated NSAGs in numerous 
situations, including ISIL in Syria and Iraq, Hamas in Gaza, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
in Yemen, and Boko Haram in Nigeria – these last two countries also being identified as at risk of 
famine. Seven years after the problem came to the fore in Somalia, sanctions and counterterrorism 
measures continue to affect humanitarian actors’ capacity to conduct operations in accordance 
with humanitarian principles.
1 See, De Waal, A, ‘The Nazis Used It, We Use It’ (2017), London Review of Books, 39(12), pp. 9–12, https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n12/alex-de-waal/
the-nazis-used-it-we-use-it?utm_source=LRB+icymi&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20170702+icymi&utm_content=ukrw_nonsubs 
(accessed 14 Jul. 2017).
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In 2016, as part of a joint project on Humanitarian Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups 
between Chatham House’s International Security Department and International Law Programme,2 
three research papers were commissioned to explore, respectively, the international regulatory 
framework, that of the UK, and the impact on UK-based humanitarian organizations of banking-sector 
restrictions.3 This paper now distils key points that emerged from the three papers already published, 
and from a series of workshops and consultations convened by Chatham House, and makes a number 
of recommendations for advancing the debate.4
This is not a new issue; the international regulatory framework in particular has received 
considerable attention in recent years. It has been addressed in numerous academic and policy 
publications and discussions.5 This has led to valuable engagement between key stakeholders: states, 
in their capacity as donors to humanitarian organizations, but also as adopters and implementers 
of sanctions and counterterrorism measures; humanitarian organizations; and, more recently, the 
banking sector. These are essential steps in raising awareness of the problem and in establishing 
channels of communication, as finding solutions requires the commitment and goodwill of all 
stakeholders. But it is now necessary to progress to the next stage: identifying concrete ways of 
addressing the tensions between sanctions, counterterrorism measures and humanitarian action.
The topic is sensitive and complex, and a degree of confusion remains, even among those who have 
been involved in the discussions.6 There is a need to broaden awareness of the issues beyond the 
relatively small circle of experts currently familiar with them within governments, and international 
and humanitarian organizations.
2 For the first phase of the project see Lewis, P. and Keating, M. (2016), Towards a Principled Approach to Engagement with Non-state Armed 
Groups for Humanitarian Purposes, Briefing, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/
towards-principled-approach-engagement-non-state-armed-groups-humanitarian-purposes; and MacLeod, A., Hofmann, C., Saul, B., Webb, J. 
and Hogg, C. L. (2016), Humanitarian Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/international-security-department/humanitarian-engagement-non-state-armed-groups-project.
3 Gillard, E.-C. (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The International Legal Framework, Research Paper, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/humanitarian-action-and-non-state-armed-groups-international-
legal-framework; Jones, K. (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The UK Regulatory Environment, London: Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/humanitarian-action-and-non-state-armed-groups-uk-regulatory-
environment; and Keatinge, T. and Keen, F. (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on 
UK NGOs, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/humanitarian-action-and-non-state-
armed-groups-impact-banking-restrictions-uk-ngos (all accessed 14 July 2017).
4 Although the present project focuses on humanitarian action, peacebuilding and development efforts are also affected. See for example 
Chatham House, International Law Programme and International Security Department (2015), ‘UN Counterterrorism Legislation: Impact 
on Humanitarian, Peacebuilding and Development Action’, roundtable summary, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/
UK-Counterterrorism-Legislation111115.pdf; and Dumasy, T. and Haspeslagh, S. (2016), Proscribing peace: the impact of terrorist listing on 
peacebuilding organisations, Briefing paper, Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-r.org/resources/proscribing-peace.
5 See for example Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (2011), ‘Humanitarian Action under Scrutiny: Criminalizing 
Humanitarian Engagement’, HPCR Working Paper, http://www.hpcrresearch.org/research/criminalizing-humanitarian-engagement; 
Pantuliano, S., Mackintosh, K. and Elhawary, S. with Metcalfe, V. (2011), Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action: Tensions, impact and ways 
forward, HPG Policy Brief 43; Modirzadeh, N. K., Lewis, D. A. and Bruderlein, C. (2011), ‘Humanitarian Engagement under counter-terrorism: 
a conflict of norms and the emerging policy landscape’, International Review of the Red Cross, 93(833), p. 623; Mackintosh, K. and Duplat, 
P. (2013), Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action; Metcalfe-Hough, V., Keatinge, T. and 
Pantuliano, S. (2015), UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counter-terrorism: Perceptions and Reality, HPG Working Paper, London: Overseas 
Development Institute; Phoebe Wynn-Pope, P., Zegenhagen, Y. and Kurnadi, F. (2016), ‘Legislating against humanitarian principles: a case study 
on the humanitarian implications of Australian counterterrorism legislation’, International Review of the Red Cross, 97(897/898), p. 235. The UN 
Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism has also devoted a report to this issue: United Nations General Assembly (2015), A/70/371, 18 September 2015.
6 The degree of confusion that remains about the regulatory framework was highlighted in the pilot empirical survey conducted in 2016 by the 
Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict: Burniske, J. S. and Modirzadeh, N. K. (2017), Pilot Empirical Survey Study 
on the Impact of Counterterrorism Measures on Humanitarian Action, http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2017/02/Pilot-Empirical-Survey-Study-
and-Comment-2017.pdf (accessed 14 Jul. 2017).
Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay Between Sanctions, 
Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action 
5 | Chatham House
No one, single solution
As matter of law, the adverse impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on 
humanitarian action is essentially the same: exposure to the risk of criminal or civil liability. However, 
states’ sensitivities are more acute in relation to the latter, and the ways of resolving the problems 
are different. There is no one, single approach to alleviating the tensions. What is best suited – and 
feasible – in relation to sanctions is not necessarily the same in relation to counterterrorism measures.
This said, the issues – and the solutions – are interconnected. One reason why states include 
restrictive clauses in funding agreements is to give effect to their obligations under sanctions and 
counterterrorism measures. If it were made clear that these measures do not cover humanitarian 
action, states might be amenable to including less onerous requirements in their funding agreements. 
The same goes for banks. While a number of factors contribute to their reluctance to provide financial 
services to humanitarian organizations operating in contexts perceived as ‘high risk’ – including the 
fact these are not high-profit clients – if the regulatory framework made it clear that humanitarian 
operations do not fall within sanctions or counterterrorism offences, banks might redirect their risk 
assessments to focus on genuine risks of abuse rather than on all humanitarian activities.
Ideally, the tensions should be addressed at the international level, by the adoption of exemptions 
in UN or EU sanctions, or of exceptions in counterterrorism measures, as this would lead to their 
global replication at the national level. But change can also occur at the domestic level. This will 
have immediate effect nationally, and can progressively influence the approaches of other states 
and intergovernmental organizations.
This paper discusses three principal sources of tension with and restriction of humanitarian 
action,7 and makes recommendations for reducing them, with a particular focus on the role of states.8 
It starts by addressing sanctions and counterterrorism measures. It then sets out how these have been 
implemented by the EU, before considering banking-sector restrictions. The paper concludes with 
some general considerations on what is necessary to advance the discussions, and a summary of the 
recommendations made throughout the paper.
7 Funding agreements also impose significant restrictions, but were beyond the scope of the Chatham House project. On such restrictions, see 
for example Mackintosh and Duplat (2013), Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action, pp. 47ff.; 
and Harvard Law School/Brookings Project on Law and Security, Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project (2014), An Analysis 
of Contemporary Counterterrorism-related Clauses in Humanitarian Grant and Partnership Agreement Contracts.
8 If progress is to be achieved, it is also incumbent on humanitarian organizations to take steps to address the concerns of states and the banking 
sector. Although largely beyond the scope of this paper, the three preceding research papers from the Chatham House project also include 
recommendations addressed to humanitarian organizations. See for example Gillard (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: 
The International Legal Framework, p. 15; and Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking 
Restrictions on UK NGOs, p. 24; and also Mackintosh and Duplat (2013), Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled 
Humanitarian Action, p. 119; and Burniske and Modirzadeh (2017), Pilot Empirical Survey Study on the Impact of Counterterrorism Measures 
on Humanitarian Action, pp. 78–80.
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2. Sanctions
The problem
A number of UN Security Council sanctions regimes authorize the imposition of targeted 
sanctions against NSAG parties to armed conflicts. Of particular relevance to humanitarian action 
are financial sanctions: asset freezes that, among other things, require member states to ensure 
that funds, financial assets or economic resources are not made available to, or for the benefit 
of, designated entities.
These asset freezes can be problematic for humanitarian action. The risk exists that the obligation 
not to make assets available to designated groups will be interpreted as covering incidental payments 
that must be made to such groups for humanitarian relief to reach civilians in need – for example, tolls 
or other fees levied by groups that have effective control of the civilians or of the territory that relief 
operations must cross to reach them. It could also be interpreted as covering humanitarian goods or 
equipment that have been diverted to the groups or that otherwise benefit them, directly or indirectly.
The scope of potential liability for violating asset freezes is very broad. No intent or knowledge 
is required: it suffices that assets are made available directly or indirectly to a designated entity.
While it is asset freezes that are most likely to have an adverse impact on humanitarian action 
and that, consequently, have received the greatest attention, other forms of sanction can have 
a similar impact. A recent example of another problematic measure was the prohibition on the 
purchase of crude oil or petroleum products in the EU’s Syria sanctions, a restriction that significantly 
impeded humanitarian organizations’ operations.9 Less disruptive, but challenging nonetheless, are 
the situations where autonomous US export bans require licences from the US Commerce Department 
for the export of goods and technology with more than 10 per cent US content value, even if they 
are foreign-produced items. Such licences can take months to secure, if they are issued at all, and 
the legal costs of obtaining one can outweigh the value of the goods in question.10
The most effective solution: exemptions for humanitarian action
Exemptions in sanctions are the most effective way to ensure that restrictions do not apply to 
humanitarian action. The principal alternative to exemptions are licences issued by individual member 
states, but exemptions are preferable for a number of reasons. First, they make it clear from the 
outset that humanitarian activities do not fall within the scope of the sanctions, and that operations 
can be conducted wherever there are needs, in accordance with the humanitarian principle of 
impartiality. Second, obtaining licences is time-consuming and expensive – even licensing authorities 
recognize this.11 Third, separate licences are necessary from every state that has a connection with 
9 Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 Art 6(b). As discussed below, in December 2016 the prohibition was revoked for humanitarian actors that 
receive public funding from the EU or its member states to provide humanitarian relief to civilians in Syria: Council Regulation (EU) 2016/2137 
of 6 December 2016 amending Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria.
10 Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on UK NGOs, p. 19.
11 For example, on the delays in the UK licensing system see http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/8027.
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a relief operation, including the state of nationality of the humanitarian organization and those 
through which the relief goods must transit and where the operations will be conducted. Fourth, 
and paradoxically, as far as the banking sector is concerned, licences have proved counterproductive. 
Some banks have interpreted the fact that humanitarians have obtained a licence to operate as an 
indication that their activities are ‘on the edge’ of legality. Instead of reassuring banks, licences are 
a red flag in their risk assessments. Finally, some humanitarian organizations consider that the process 
of requesting and obtaining licences puts them in too close a relationship with the states that issue 
them, undermining their neutrality and perceptions thereof – and, possibly, their capacity to operate 
in an impartial manner, responding solely on the basis of need, if the state refuses to issue licences 
for operations in areas under the control of designated groups. Despite this, and until a greater 
number of sanctions regimes include exemptions, licences have been the principal way in which 
states have excluded payments made in the course of certain humanitarian operations from the scope 
of asset freezes. In view of this, the arrangements for obtaining licences and, in the case of regional 
organizations such as the EU, the possibility for mutual recognition, warrant further research.
At present, only one UN Security Council sanctions regime – relating to Somalia – includes an express 
exemption for humanitarian assistance. This was adopted in 2010, at the time of the famine in areas 
controlled by al-Shaabab – an NSAG subject to an asset freeze under the sanctions.12 The existence of 
the exemption shows that the Security Council is aware of the risk that humanitarian activities may 
fall within the scope of sanctions, and also of how to avoid this problem.
In view of this, why have similar exemptions not been adopted in other contexts where the 
same risk exists? The systematic adoption of exemptions for humanitarian action was one of the 
recommendations of the recent High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions.13
The Somalia exemption was adopted after a focused and public push by humanitarian actors 
unable to provide assistance to populations faced with famine. Since then, there has not been 
a similar concerted effort to persuade the Security Council to adopt an exemption in other contexts. 
The Security Council is an extremely cautious body, and will not adopt an exemption of its own 
accord. It needs to be actively pushed into doing so.
12 First introduced by UN Security Council Resolution [henceforth SCR] 1916 (2010), OP 5, and most recently reiterated in SCR 2317 (2016), 
OP 28. In 2010 there was opposition to the inclusion of the exemption, including from within the UN Secretariat, on the grounds that all asset 
freezes included implicit exemptions for humanitarian action – as a minimum when conducted by UN agencies, funds and programmes and their 
implementing partners. Opponents were concerned that the inclusion of the exemption in the Somalia sanctions could be interpreted a contrario 
as indicating that, in the absence of a similar exemption, assets transferred in the course of humanitarian action could fall within the scope of 
asset freezes in other sanction regimes. They insisted that the exemption be prefaced by the words ‘without prejudice to humanitarian assistance 
programmes conducted elsewhere’. Paradoxically and regrettably, these words appear to have been interpreted to mean the precise opposite. 
Author interviews, New York, October 2016.
13 2015 High Level Review [henceforth HLR] of UN Sanctions, http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_Compendium_2015.pdf, Recommendation 
25 and discussion at p. 55. See also Working Group III, UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges, Chairpersons’ Report, 
19 January 2015.
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Raising awareness and gathering information: the need for 
a systematic approach
Somalia was an extreme situation, in which the UN eventually declared a famine.14 The Security 
Council will have to be persuaded of the need for exemptions for humanitarian action in other 
contexts, where the needs are perceived as less severe. Experience in other areas has shown that in 
order to advance a relatively new issue, it must be brought to the attention of the Security Council 
in a systematic way. Change requires consistency and time.
If progress is to occur, all UN member states’ awareness of the adverse impact of sanctions on 
humanitarian action must be raised. While authority for adopting sanctions lies with the Security 
Council, implementing them is a shared obligation of all member states. All therefore have an 
important role to play in highlighting the problem and in putting pressure on the Security Council 
to act. Until now, the issue has not been taken up by the UK, the Security Council member with 
the lead on the thematic agenda item relating to the protection of civilians, or by France, the 
frequent champion of humanitarian initiatives. In any event, elected members of the Security 
Council are frequently more successful than permanent members in advancing thematic issues. 
Raising awareness of the problem among the broader UN membership may enable future 
elected Security Council members to champion a solution.
A prerequisite for raising awareness is collecting information on the adverse impact of sanctions on 
humanitarian action. This is necessary at various stages: before sanctions are adopted; throughout their 
implementation; and before they are renewed. When the Security Council is considering the imposition 
of financial sanctions, it should – in consultation with humanitarian agencies and organizations – 
conduct an assessment of their possible adverse impact on humanitarian action.15 Once it has imposed 
sanctions, it should require panels of experts to conduct and report on such impact assessments.16
In order to gather the necessary information, the dialogue between the Security Council as 
a whole, sanctions committees and their panels of experts, and humanitarian organizations should 
be enhanced and systematized. At present, humanitarian actors informally brief Security Council 
members on protection issues ahead of the establishment and/or renewal of peacekeeping operations, 
by means of the informal expert group on the protection of civilians.17 Ways of establishing a similar 
systematic dialogue on the country-specific impact of sanctions on humanitarian action should be 
explored. A first possible step to highlight the issue could be for the informal expert group to hold 
a thematic meeting on it.
14 ‘UN declares famine in another three areas of Somalia’, 3 August 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39225#.WZGd59Pyu7N. 
In fact, one of the political goals of the declaration of famine was to put pressure on the US to find a workaround for the provisions of its 
counterterrorism legislation that exposed humanitarian actors responding to the famine to criminal liability. See de Waal, A. (2017), ‘On the 
Significance of the Declaration of Famine in South Sudan’, World Peace Foundation Reinventing Peace blog, 28 February 2017, http://sites.tufts.
edu/reinventingpeace/2017/02/28/on-the-significance-of-the-declaration-of-famine-in-south-sudan/ (accessed 14 July 2017).
15 HLR Recommendation 136.
16 HLR Recommendation 64.
17 On the Informal Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians, see Gillard, E.-C. and Piacibello, J. (2015), ‘The Role of the Security Council 
in Enhancing the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts’, in Instituto Diplomático/Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (eds) (2015), 
A Participação de Portugal no Conselho de Segurança: 2011–2012.
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This said, some permanent Security Council members consider that all aspects of sanctions fall under 
the Council’s exclusive mandate, including gathering information on their impact, a role entrusted 
to the panels of experts that it appoints. In the past, however, the Security Council has tasked UN 
humanitarian agencies with conducting assessments and pre-assessments of the humanitarian impact 
of sanctions more broadly, and nothing precludes it from doing so again in relation to the narrower 
question of their impact on humanitarian action.18 In view of this, arrangements should be established 
for sanctions committees and panels of experts to systematically consult humanitarian actors.19
On their side, humanitarians will have to find ways of sharing information on the adverse impact of 
sanctions on their operations in a manner that addresses some actors’ reservations about engaging too 
closely with a political body such as the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies.
Once this information has been gathered, numerous possible avenues exist for raising awareness. 
For example, the Security Council could request sanctions committee panels of experts to include 
such information in their reports as a matter of course. If special representatives of the Secretary-
General have been appointed for the contexts where relevant sanctions have been imposed, the 
Security Council could request them to provide information on any adverse impact of sanctions on 
humanitarian action in their periodic reports. The final versions of the both types of reports are public 
documents, and so can therefore reach a broader audience than the Security Council members alone.
One of challenges of raising awareness is the ‘siloed’ nature of the UN – both within formal bodies, 
such as the sanctions committees, and also frequently in terms of responsibilities within permanent 
missions. State representatives participating in sanctions committees are sanctions experts, or possibly 
‘geographic’ experts, who are – regrettably – unlikely to engage with their colleagues responsible 
for humanitarian affairs. However, the question of the impact of sanctions on humanitarian action 
falls across all these portfolios. As is the case within governments in capital, states should ensure 
that all relevant experts within their permanent missions are aware of the issue and contribute 
to the elaboration of a coherent position that balances humanitarian needs with political and 
security concerns.
Modalities for adopting exemptions
In terms of modalities for adopting exemptions for humanitarian action, the possibility of an 
‘omnibus’ or ‘comprehensive’ exemption has been advanced. This would be a self-standing resolution 
where the Security Council would undertake to systematically include exemptions for humanitarian 
action in sanctions. This is a good and simple option in theory, but it is questionable whether this 
approach is the most likely to succeed. Admittedly, the Security Council has adopted a small number 
of thematic resolutions, recommending that a range of actors take particular measures to address 
a specific issue.20 It could take a similar approach with regard to sanctions. A thematic resolution could 
include a number of the good practices just mentioned in terms of raising awareness, as well as the 
undertaking to systematically include exemptions for humanitarian action.
However, given its extreme caution generally, Security Council sensitivities in relation to sanctions run 
particularly high. It also tends to be reluctant to commit itself to systematically taking a particular 
course of action. In view of this, at present, making the case for humanitarian exemptions on 
18 HLR, p. 83.
19 HLR Recommendation 65.
20 See for example SCR 1894 (2009), 11 November 2009, on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
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a case-by-case basis is preferable. This allows the Security Council to retain greater control of decisions, 
as well as the capacity to tailor its approach as appropriate to each circumstance. Its confidence in 
exemptions for humanitarian action needs to be built gradually, including by showing that these are 
effective and are not abused.21
The Security Council has imposed asset freezes against NSAG parties to armed conflicts in the country-
specific sanctions regimes relating to Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the 
Central African Republic (CAR).22 It has also done so against ISIL (Da’esh)/Al-Qaida and the Taliban 
in sanctions regimes framed in terms of counterterrorism.23 Security Council members are likely to 
be more open to adopting exemptions for humanitarian action in country-specific sanctions rather 
than in counterterrorism ones, where sensitivities are more acute and concerns about abuse are more 
serious. Progress is therefore more likely to be achievable in relation to country-specific sanctions in 
the first instance. Positive practices developed in this area could encourage the subsequent adoption 
of similar measures in relation to counterterrorism-related sanctions.
This said, it is the ISIL (Da’esh)/Al-Qaida sanctions panel of experts that has taken the initiative 
in proactively engaging with humanitarians, asking for information on the adverse impact of 
the sanctions. The panel has also indicated its concern that asset freezes, and banks’ consequent 
restriction of services to humanitarian organizations with operations in areas where designated 
entities are based, have led some organizations to resort to informal and unregulated channels to 
transfer the funds necessary to operate. This makes it more difficult to monitor such funds, and 
increases the risk of the very abuse the sanctions are trying to prevent.24 Humanitarian organizations 
may have found an unexpected ally in the ISIL (Da’esh)/Al-Qaida panel of experts in advocating 
for exemption for humanitarian action to be included in the asset freeze.
Some humanitarian organizations’ reservations about exemptions
As noted earlier, the Security Council is unlikely to adopt exemptions for humanitarian action 
unless it is pushed to do so. In 2010 humanitarian organizations that found themselves unable to 
operate in Somalia for fear of violating the asset freeze were the driving force behind the adoption of 
the exemption. Since then, there has not been a similar concerted effort in relation to other contexts, 
in part because humanitarian organizations do not have a common position on exemptions. While 
there is general agreement that licences – the principal alternative to exemptions – are ineffective 
for the reasons given above, some humanitarian organizations have reservations about exemptions, 
for a variety of reasons.25
21 Feedback from those monitoring sanctions in Somalia, the only context in relation to which the Security Council has adopted an exemption 
for humanitarian action, notes that while Somalia remains a context where it is impossible to expect zero diversion – something all stakeholders 
acknowledge – the exemption has not increased the problem. On the contrary, its existence has opened a space for humanitarian actors and state 
donors to discuss constructive ways of reducing such risks. Author interviews, Rome, March–April 2017.
22 In Somalia, pursuant to SCR 1844 (2008); the DRC, pursuant to SCR 1596 (2005) as subsequently amended including, most notably, by SCR 
1807 (2008); Libya pursuant to SCR 1970 (2011); the CAR, pursuant to SCR 2134 (2015); Yemen, pursuant to SCR 2140 (2014); and South Sudan 
pursuant to SCR 2206 (2015).
23 SRC 1267 (1999) established a sanctions regime exclusively addressing the Taliban. SCR 1390 (2002) expanded it to include Al-Qaida. In 2011 
SCRs 1988 and 1989 separated them into two sanctions regimes focusing on the Taliban and Al-Qaida respectively. In 2015 SCR 2253 expanded 
the Al-Qaida regime to include individuals and entities supporting ISIL (Da’esh). Note that renderings of names of entities in this paper follow 
usage in current UN sanctions documentation and may differ from those in other papers in the series.
24 Author interviews, New York, Geneva and Rome, October 2016–May 2017.
25 Some humanitarian actors’ reservations are set out in Burniske and Modirzadeh (2017), Pilot Empirical Survey Study on the Impact 
of Counterterrorism Measures on Humanitarian Action.
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Some are simply insufficiently familiar with the issue to feel comfortable in taking a position. Others 
confuse the restrictions arising from sanctions with those in donor agreements, and believe that asset 
freezes do not concern them as long as they do not accept funding from states. Others still benefit 
from privileges and immunities, and so are not directly concerned by the risk of prosecutions for 
violating sanctions.26
A further concern is that the inclusion of exemption clauses may actually limit rather than expand 
humanitarian actors’ capacity to operate. States are concerned about the risk of abuse of exemptions, 
so they have limited their application to organizations that they trust. The exemption in the Somalia 
sanctions is framed broadly, and effectively covers all key international humanitarian actors,27 but this 
is not necessarily always the case. The exemption in the EU’s Syria oil sanctions, for example, only 
applies to ‘legal persons, entities or bodies which receive public funding from the Union or Member 
States to provide humanitarian relief or assistance to the civilian population in Syria’.28 In view of 
this, some humanitarian organizations consider that exemptions may be counterproductive, as they 
could be interpreted as prohibiting the activities of organizations that do not fall within their scope. 
Moreover, if exemptions are not included in all sanctions regimes, their absence in certain ones could 
be interpreted as indicating that humanitarian activities do fall within the scope of the sanctions. 
In view of this, some organizations prefer the ambiguity of sanctions that do not expressly address 
humanitarian action.
Other reservations relate to the conditions that the Security Council may attach to exemptions, 
in particular that these may be inappropriate or may put humanitarian organizations in too close 
a relationship with a political body. This concern is based on the Somalia sanctions, when, in 2010, 
in addition to granting an exemption for humanitarian action, the Security Council also requested the 
UN Humanitarian Aid Coordinator for Somalia to report periodically on measures taken to mitigate 
the ‘politicization, misuse, and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance by armed groups’.29 As 
the Security Council only focused on the practices of one side in the conflict – the armed groups – the 
arrangement was seen as having co-opted humanitarians into advancing its political agenda. The 
reporting requirement has since been amended, and now relates to any impediments to the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance in Somalia – not just those imposed by armed groups. Despite this, some 
humanitarian organizations remain wary that the quid pro quo for exemptions will be a requirement 
to contribute to further the Security Council’s political objectives. They consider this would affect 
perceptions of their neutrality and, consequently, their capacity to conduct operations in a manner 
that is safe for staff and beneficiaries.
Whatever the merits of the various reservations, there is a need for a focused discussion on 
exemptions among humanitarian organizations to see whether their concerns can be addressed 
and to explore realistic options for doing so.
26 Humanitarian organizations may benefit from privileges and immunities from domestic proceedings under multilateral conventions like the 
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies, or under bilateral agreements with the states where they operate.
27 SCR 2317, 10 November 2016: under OP 28 the asset freeze does not apply to ‘the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources 
necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or 
programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, 
and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United 
Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia’. While the principal international humanitarian organizations have observer status, many 
local ones do not.
28 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/2137 of 6 December 2016, Article 1(2).
29 SCR 1916, 19 March 2010, OPs 4 and 11.
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If it adopts exemptions for humanitarian action, the Security Council is also likely to require 
humanitarian organizations to take specific measures to minimize the risk of diversion – even though 
this has not been the case to date in either the Security Council’s Somalia sanctions or the EU’s Syria 
ones. Such measures are already an integral part of humanitarian actors’ due diligence practice in all 
contexts, but if they do not engage with the Security Council or the EU to discuss an approach they 
consider acceptable, it will be the Security Council or the EU that sets the conditions.
The national level
Many of the recommendations just made in relation to the adoption and implementation of 
sanctions at the multinational level are equally relevant at the national level. States that are involved 
in the adoption of sanctions at the multilateral level – for example, Security Council members or EU 
member states – should, in advance of their adoption, consult humanitarian organizations on the 
possible adverse impact of the sanctions on operations. All states should do so once the sanctions 
are implemented nationally. Consultations should continue throughout the implementation of the 
sanctions, so that any adverse consequences can be identified and brought to the attention of the 
international bodies responsible for the sanctions. This constructive interaction between states and 
humanitarian organizations is what led to the adoption of the exemption for humanitarian actors 
in the EU’s Syria oil sanctions.
While states may adopt more onerous autonomous measures when implementing UN sanctions 
in national legislation, it is unclear whether there is any latitude for them to insert exemptions for 
humanitarian action in national legislation if UN sanctions do not include them. This question, 
as well as the domestic implementation of UN and EU sanctions, warrants further research.
In the absence of exceptions for humanitarian action in domestic legislation, it has been suggested 
that guidance could be issued to prosecutors and made public, indicating that humanitarian action is 
not the intended focus of prosecutions. This is the approach adopted in the US by the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC), the body responsible for implementing and enforcing sanctions.30 In practice, 
however, such guidance does not appear to have allayed the reservations of banks, which remain 
wary of providing services to humanitarian organizations for operations in ‘high-risk’ contexts.
30 The October 2014 OFAC ‘Guidance related to the provision of humanitarian assistance by not-for-profit non-governmental organizations’ 
notes that ‘some humanitarian assistance may unwittingly end up in the hands of members of a designated group. Such incidental benefits are not 
a focus for OFAC sanctions enforcement’. The Guidance also emphasizes that it is intended for informational purposes and does not have the force 
of law. See www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/ngo_humanitarian.pdf.
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3. Counterterrorism Measures
The problem
Stemming the flow of funds to organizations designated as terrorist is a core component of 
the international community’s counterterrorism strategy. At the international level, the 1999 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism31 and UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (2001)32 require states to criminalize the provision or collection of funds 
or other assets or making them available for the commission of acts of terrorism. These prohibitions 
can potentially capture humanitarian relief supplies that are diverted to such organizations or that 
otherwise benefit them, as well as incidental payments that humanitarian actors must make to 
them to be able to operate.
Potential liability under these instruments is more narrowly defined than in relation to sanctions. 
Offences are only committed if assets are collected or provided with the intent or in the knowledge 
that they will be used for the commission of acts of terrorism.
Possible solutions
As is the case for sanctions, the most effective way of ensuring that funds or other assets that 
reach designated entities in the course of humanitarian operations do not fall within the scope 
of counterterrorism measures would be for this to be noted expressly in the relevant international 
instruments. However, neither the 1999 Convention nor Resolution 1373 refers to humanitarian 
action. This is not surprising, as both instruments were adopted before the potential adverse impact 
of such measures on humanitarian action had been identified. In fact, it was as a result of the 
implementation of instruments such as these that the problem became apparent.
At the international level
States have started highlighting the potential adverse impact of counterterrorism measures 
on humanitarian action at the international level. The UN General Assembly has recently done 
31 Article 2 of the Convention makes it an offence to provide or collect funds by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, with the 
intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out an act of terrorism. Funds 
are defined in Article 1 very broadly to refer to ‘assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, 
and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not 
limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit’.
32  OP 1 of SCR 1373 (2001) requires states to:
 (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
 (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the  
 intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
 …
 (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or  
 financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate  
 or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and 
 entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons.
 OP 2 (e) builds upon this by requiring states to:
 (e)  Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist 
 acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious 
  criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the terrorist acts[.]
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so on two occasions. In December 2015, in its annual resolution on the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, it urged states, ‘while undertaking counter-
terrorism activities, to respect their international obligations regarding humanitarian actors and 
to recognize the key role played by humanitarian organizations in areas where terrorist groups 
are active’.33
Similarly, in its July 2016 resolution on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the General 
Assembly urged states ‘to ensure, in accordance with their obligations under international law 
and national regulations, and whenever international humanitarian law is applicable, that 
counter-terrorism legislation and measures do not impede humanitarian and medical activities 
or engagement with all relevant actors as foreseen by international humanitarian law’.34
The inclusion of these provisions in General Assembly resolutions is a positive development that 
shows states’ increasing awareness of the potential adverse impact of counterterrorism measures, and 
suggests a willingness to begin to address these tensions. However, the resolutions are not binding. 
They will not lead to an amendment of the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, and it is improbable 
that the Security Council will adopt a binding resolution requiring states to exclude humanitarian 
action from counterterrorism measures. At present, change is more likely to occur at the national 
level as discussed below.
As is the case for sanctions, in order to advance the discussion – at the international and 
national level – it is necessary to systematically raise awareness of the issue. While the references 
to the tensions in the General Assembly resolutions do not of themselves solve the problem, they 
are a positive step. They should be retained and be built upon in future resolutions.
Other ways should also be found for enhancing awareness of the problem and finding ways 
of reconciling tensions. One possible avenue is the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force (CTITF), the entity responsible for strengthening the coordination of the UN system’s 
counterterrorism efforts. Its Working Group on Promoting and Protecting Human Rights while 
Countering Terrorism played an important role in highlighting human rights concerns. The adverse 
impact of counterterrorism on humanitarian action has received less attention. The Working Group 
on Countering the Financing of Terrorism brings together UN entities and international organizations 
to discuss how to counter the financing of terrorism and implement international standards, 
including the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention and the recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF).35 In 2009 the working group issued a report that touched on terrorist financing 
and the non-profit sector, principally by flagging the risk of abuse.36 It should revisit the topic to 
reflect developments in the debates since then, and make recommendations that are relevant to 
the current situation. The extent to which humanitarian concerns have been raised in its activities 
is unclear. UN agencies, funds and programmes engaged in humanitarian action should endeavour 
to participate in the Working Group to inject this dimension into the discussions.
33 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/148, 17 December 2015, OP 7.
34 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/291, 1 July 2016, OP 22.
35 The FATF – an intergovernmental body originally established to develop measures to combat money laundering whose mandate was expanded 
in 2001 to include terrorist financing – has played an important role in increasing banks’ reluctance to provide services to clients perceived as 
‘high risk’. It has developed a series of recommendations to promote effective implementation of measures to combat terrorist financing.
36 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (2009), Tackling the Financing of Terrorism, CTITF Working Group Report, 
pp. 16–18, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_financing_eng_final.pdf.
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At the national level
At present, change is more likely to occur when states adopt legislation implementing their 
international obligations in domestic law. The tension between counterterrorism legislation and 
humanitarian action can be addressed in a number of ways. The clearest is for states to include an 
express exception for humanitarian action in offences of providing support to designated entities. 
Such exceptions are rare; in one such instance, the Australian Criminal Code includes an exception to 
the offence of associating with terrorist organizations when this is only for the purpose of providing 
aid of a humanitarian nature.37 A second terrorism-related offence, entering or remaining in a 
‘declared area’ – i.e. an area declared by the foreign minister as one where a listed foreign entity is 
engaging in hostile activity – is not committed if a person enters, or remains in, the area solely for 
legitimate purposes, including the provision of aid of a humanitarian nature.38 The 1994 US legislation 
establishing the crime of providing material support or resources to terrorist acts originally excluded 
the provision of humanitarian assistance to persons not directly involved in such acts.39 In 1996 
the exception was narrowed to exclude only the provision of medicine or religious material.40
One of the reasons for the scarcity of exceptions is that many states adopted legislation implementing 
the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention and Security Council Resolution 1373 before the extent of 
the potential adverse impact of counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action was identified, so 
they did not address the issue. While understandable, this is unfortunate, because amending existing 
legislation is much more difficult than is including exceptions from the outset.
The UK is a case in point: in 2015 a parliamentary committee recommended that the government 
consider introducing exceptions to counterterrorism legislation for humanitarian activities. The 
Home Office and Treasury Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation responded: ‘We assess that 
introducing a specific exemption for humanitarian and/or conflict resolution work would create a 
loophole that could be exploited by unscrupulous individuals and leave NGOs vulnerable to abuse’.41 
No explanation was given of the basis for this assessment, nor was it explained why the risk of 
exploitation could not be reduced by inclusion of a suitably worded intention requirement.42
States have a further opportunity to insert exclusions in existing counterterrorism legislation 
when revising it to give effect to new international obligations such as those under Security Council 
Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters. At this juncture, they could either insert a general 
exception for humanitarian action, or, as a minimum, include one in relation to the new offences. 
This said, if exceptions are only included in new offences, the risk exists that their absence with 
regard to existing offences could be interpreted as meaning that humanitarian action could fall 
within their scope.
A second option for reducing tensions is for states to frame counterterrorism offences narrowly 
to make it less likely that they would cover support provided in the course of humanitarian action. 
States have taken different approaches in giving effect to the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention 
and Security Council Resolution 1373 in national law. Some have followed the language of the 
37 Australia, Criminal Code Division 102.8.
38 Australia, Criminal Code Division 119.2(3)(a). So-called ‘declared areas’ currently include the provinces of Ninewa in Iraq and Al Raqqa 
in Syria – both areas where humanitarian needs are severe.
39 USA, 18 USC, para. 2339A.
40 USA, 1994, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Section 120005, Providing Material Support to Terrorists, 120005(a), definitions.
41 Jones (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The UK Regulatory Environment, p. 13; and Joint Committee on the Draft 
Protection of Charities Bill, Draft Protection of Charities Bill, HL Paper 108, HC 103, February 2015, para. 186.
42 Jones (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The UK Regulatory Environment, p. 13.
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1999 Convention more closely, criminalizing the provision of funds with the knowledge or intent 
that they will be used to commit an act of terrorism.43 Others have taken a broader approach, 
criminalizing support to a terrorist group more generally.44 This second approach is more problematic 
for humanitarian actors, as the offences are defined broadly enough to capture payments made to 
designated groups in order to operate, or diverted relief supplies.
A small number of states have established positions to exercise independent oversight over the 
application of counterterrorism measures; the precise modalities for their creation and their 
mandates differ.45 In the UK, for instance, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has 
played a crucial role in critically reviewing counterterrorism legislation at regular intervals on the 
basis of extensive engagement with key government departments as well as with a broad range 
of other stakeholders, highlighting concerns and making recommendations for improving the 
counterterrorism framework.46 Other states should consider establishing similar positions.
Possibly paradoxically, while it is the fear of proceedings for violating sanctions and counterterrorism 
measures that is leading humanitarian organizations to curtail their operations – frequently by over-
complying with the law – and banks to adopt restrictions, a court decision could in fact clarify the 
scope of the law. Decisions are only binding in the state where they are handed down; but, in the same 
way that the US Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project drew global attention 
to the problem, they could nonetheless shed useful light more generally.47 Clarity can of course 
cut both ways, and the risk exists that a court would interpret the regulatory framework in a more 
restrictive manner than that in which it had previously been applied in practice. This goes to the heart 
of the debate as to whether it is preferable to have greater clarity, or more grey areas and thus margin 
for manoeuvre.
43 See for example France, Code pénal, 421-2-2; Germany, 1993 Money Laundering Act; and the Netherlands, Article 4 Criminal Code, discussed 
in Mackintosh and Duplat (2013), Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action, pp. 29–32.
44 See for example Australia, Criminal Code Division 102.6 and 102.7; and Denmark, Section 114 Criminal Code, discussed in Mackintosh 
and Duplat (2013), Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action, pp. 23–25 and 28.
45 The closest equivalent to the UK Independent Reviewer is Australia’s Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. See 
Blackbourn, J. (2014), ‘Independent reviewers as alternative: an empirical study from Australia and the United Kingdom’, in Davis, F. F. and 
de Londras, F. (eds) (2014), Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorism Judicial Review, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On the proposals to 
establish a similar position in Canada, see Forcese, C. and Roach, K. (2016), Bridging the National Security Accountability Gap: A Three-Part System 
to Modernize Canada’s Inadequate Review of National Security, Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2016-05. Although their mandates 
are different, the Défenseur des Droits Publics in France and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in the US have carried out similar 
reviews of counterterrorism legislation.
46 Anderson, D. (2014), ‘The Independent Review of Terrorism Laws’, Public Law (2014), 403.
47 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), 130 S.Ct. 2705. In this decision, the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the federal Material Support Statute that prohibits knowingly providing ‘material support or resources’ to designated ‘foreign terrorist 
organizations’. For the purposes of the statute, ‘material support or resources’ includes any property, tangible or intangible, or service, 
including lodging, training, expert advance or assistance. The petitioners wanted to train members of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) to use 
international law to resolve disputes; teach PKK members how to petition UN bodies; and engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds living 
in Turkey or Tamils living in Sri Lanka, but refrained from doing so for fear of prosecution under the Material Support Statute. The Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, and found that the proposed activities, even though they focused on training, were prohibited. In doing 
so it relied on a broad conception of ‘fungibility’, which led it to conclude that even though some foreign terrorist organizations engage in political 
and humanitarian activities, they ‘are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct’. 
For a detailed discussion of the litigation, see Modirzadeh et al (2011), ‘Humanitarian Engagement under counter-terrorism’, pp. 629ff.; and 
Doyle, C. (2016), Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C §2339A and §2339B, Congressional Research Service, https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/R41333.pdf.
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4. The EU Dimension
For EU member states, measures adopted by the EU are an additional source of obligation. As far 
as sanctions are concerned, UN Security Council sanctions are given effect in EU member states by 
means of EU regulations. The EU may additionally adopt autonomous sanctions – either expanding 
Security Council sanctions or imposing them in relation to additional contexts, such as Syria or 
Ukraine, where the Security Council was unable to reach agreement.48
The EU’s approach to exemptions for humanitarian action in sanctions is not uniform. Where it is 
simply implementing UN sanctions, it follows the approach of the Security Council. There is thus an 
exemption in the Somalia sanctions but not in the others.49 When it imposes autonomous sanctions, 
it sometimes includes exemptions and at other times foresees the possibility for member states to 
issue licences.
As stated, asset freezes are not the only form of restriction that may have an adverse impact on 
humanitarian action. Until recently, for example, the EU’s Syria sanctions included a prohibition 
on the purchase of crude oil or petroleum products in Syria50 – a restriction that significantly 
impeded humanitarian actors’ operations. In December 2016 the sanctions were amended to remove 
this prohibition for humanitarian actors that receive public funding from the EU, or from member 
states to provide humanitarian relief to civilians in Syria.51 The amendment is a positive instance 
of constructive engagement between states and humanitarian actors. A member state raised this 
issue on the basis of input received from humanitarian organizations. The issue was discussed in 
the sanctions group of the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors, and a formulation was 
agreed that balanced the needs of humanitarian actors with the concerns of some member states 
that the exemption could be abused.
This dialogue between states, the multilateral organizations imposing sanctions and humanitarian 
actors should be built on, with a view to making such engagement systematic – both before the 
adoption of sanctions, and throughout their implementation.
The EU has also adopted measures to stem terrorist financing. These take two forms: first, Council 
Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, 
inter alia, gives effect to Security Council Resolution 1373 for the EU and its member states.52 Of 
particular relevance to humanitarian action, it requires the European Community to ensure that 
funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services will not be made 
available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of designated persons, groups and entities.53
48 Initially imposed by Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 in relation to Syria, and by Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP 
of 3 June 2014 in relation to Ukraine.
49 Council Regulation (EU) No 356/2010 of 26 April 2010 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain natural or 
legal persons, entities or bodies, in view of the situation in Somalia, Article 4(1).
50 Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012, Art 6(b).
51 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/2137 of 6 December 2016, Article 1. Article 2 requires humanitarian actors funded by other sources to 
apply for licences.
52 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP).
53 Ibid., Article 3. Article 3 of the Common Council Position is given effect to by Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001. The list of designated 
entities is found in Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/154 updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures of combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136, Official Journal 
of the European Community, 28.1.2017, L 23/21.
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The second element of the EU regulatory framework is based on Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Combating Terrorism.54 This new 
instrument requires EU member states to criminalize a number of acts. Of relevance to humanitarian 
action is ‘terrorist financing’, defined as intentionally ‘providing or collecting funds, by any means, 
directly or indirectly, with the intention that they be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be 
used, in full or in part, to commit or to contribute to any of the offences’ defined as terrorist in the 
directive.55 The mental element required for the commission of the offence is high, and it is unlikely 
that it would cover funds that reach entities considered to be terrorist in the course of humanitarian 
action. In addition, the preamble of the directive refers to humanitarian action, noting:
The provision of humanitarian activities by impartial humanitarian organisations recognised by 
international law, including international humanitarian law, do not fall under the scope of this Directive, 
while taking into account the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.56
To date, academic and policy discussions on the interplay between sanctions, counterterrorism and 
humanitarian action have tended to focus on the Security Council, with the EU receiving far less 
attention. This is unwarranted: not only does the EU play a significant role in implementing Security 
Council decisions, but it also autonomously adopts sanctions and counterterrorism measures that 
must be implemented by member states – many of which are important donors to humanitarian 
action, and are therefore presumably aware of and responsive to the challenges facing humanitarian 
actors. The exemption in the Syria sanctions and the safeguard clause in the new directive suggest that 
the EU is aware of the tensions and is willing to take measures to address them. The EU dimension 
is an avenue that warrants further research and continued engagement by humanitarian actors. 
In addition to establishing good practices for member states, the EU’s approach can serve 
as a positive example for the Security Council and non-member states.
54 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Combating Terrorism and Replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. Inter alia, this new directive expands existing 
EU counterterrorism measures to include offences relating to foreign terrorist fighters pursuant to SCR 2178 (2014).
55 Ibid., Article 11(1).
56 Ibid., preambular para. 38.
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5. Banking-sector Restrictions
The problem
Like humanitarian actors, banks must comply with sanctions and counterterrorism measures. 
They must refrain from making any funds, financial assets, economic resources, or financial or other 
related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons or entities designated under 
sanctions regimes, or that commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission 
of terrorist acts. Not only must banks not provide resources or services to such persons or entities 
themselves, they must also not provide them indirectly.
Fear of violating these measures, coupled with a perception – fuelled to a significant degree by 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)57 – that the sector is vulnerable to abuse, the reality that 
humanitarian organizations are rarely profitable clients, and the ‘derisking’ conducted by banks 
following the financial crisis of 2008,58 has led to a significant restriction in the financial services 
provided to humanitarian organizations. This is particularly the case for those operating in so-called 
‘high-risk jurisdictions’, in or near areas where designated NSAGs are based or operate. In the UK, 
faith-based, mainly Muslim, humanitarian organizations have been particularly affected.59
Research conducted by and for Chatham House on UK-registered humanitarian actors has shown 
that these are experiencing significant difficulties in accessing the financial services that are crucial to 
their capacity to fundraise, disburse funds and thus operate. There has been an increase in regulatory 
compliance and disclosure requirements, with banks demanding increasingly detailed information 
about the organizations, their transactions and their programmes. More damagingly, humanitarian 
organizations have been unable to open accounts, receive donations or transfer funds; have 
experienced delays or significantly increased charges; or have had their accounts closed.60
57 The FATF has developed a series of recommendations to promote effective implementation of measures to combat terrorist financing. Although 
it was revised in 2016, as originally adopted, Recommendation 8 on Non Profit Organisations had asserted that NGOs ‘possess characteristics that 
make them particularly attractive to terrorists or vulnerable to misuse for terrorist financing’, including the fact that they enjoy public trust, have 
access to considerable sources of funds, and operate cash-intensive activities across borders and often in or near areas where designated NSAGs 
are based or operate. See Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on 
UK NGOs, pp. 5–7, and Gillard (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The International Legal Framework, pp. 11–12.
58 Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on UK NGOs, pp. 11–13. 
US-registered non-profit organizations have experienced very similar problems. See Eckert, S. with Guinane, K. and Hall, A. (2017), Financial 
Access for U.S. Nonprofits, (2017), Washington, DC: Charity and Security Network, pp. 39ff. and pp. 79ff.
59 Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on UK NGOs, p. 3. Attention 
has focused on banks, but credit card companies, online donation websites and internet payment services have also adopted similar restrictions; 
see Keatinge, T. (2014), Uncharitable Behaviour, London: Demos, https://www.demos.co.uk/project/uncharitable-behaviour/, p. 42.
60 This has been described by NGO representatives as ‘a war of attrition’. Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state 
Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on UK NGOs, p. 16.
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The impact on humanitarian actors has been twofold. First, it has led to increased operating costs. 
These have taken numerous forms: organizations have had to hire additional staff to meet banking 
compliance requirements, or have had to seek expensive legal advice. They have incurred significant 
losses as they are unable to access the most favourable exchange rates as a result of some banks’ 
unwillingness undertake transactions with them. When transactions are ‘returned’, charges are levied, 
and, if a foreign exchange conversion has also taken place, a loss is almost always also incurred on 
reversal. The restrictions and, in some cases, loss of banking access has also led some humanitarian 
organizations to resort to less transparent financial channels, such as third-party payment mechanisms 
via states neighbouring conflict- or sanctions-affected destinations. These are more expensive, and 
significantly increase transaction costs.61 Second, and even more problematically, the restrictions have 
caused delays in the implementation of humanitarian programmes, their scaling back and at times 
their closure.62
The impact of banking-sector restrictions is so significant that some humanitarian actors have 
noted that banks are effectively dictating where they can operate. This is paradoxical, especially 
in view of states’ efforts to develop good humanitarian donor polices and practices to finance and 
support principled humanitarian action.63
This situation is not a concern just for humanitarian actors. Ultimately, there is a real risk that 
financial institutions’ restriction of services will lead organizations to resort to informal and 
unregulated channels to transfer the funds necessary to operate.64 This will make it more difficult 
to monitor the movement of funds, and will increase the risk of the very abuse the sanctions and 
counterterrorism measures are trying to prevent.
There is increasing awareness of the problem. But while this is a positive and necessary first step 
in addressing it, at present the trend is for restrictions to become even tighter.
Possible solutions
Addressing the restrictions imposed by the banking sector is more challenging than alleviating 
the tensions raised by sanctions and counterterrorism measures per se. It is states that adopt the 
latter, and in doing so they are likely to balance the need for such measures with other public policy 
interests, including providing assistance to people in need, whatever their motivation for doing so – 
be it purely humanitarian, to prevent radicalization, or to win hearts and minds.
These considerations do not play into banks’ calculations in deciding whether to provide services to 
clients perceived as high-risk and low-profit. At present there are no incentives – regulatory or other – 
for banks to balance the risk of providing services to humanitarian organizations against the public 
policy interest in doing so.65
61 One NGO stated that its alternative arrangements cost 12 times more per transaction than its previous arrangements for overseas transfers. 
Ibid., p. 19.
62 For examples of this see ibid., pp. 16–21, and Eckert et al. (2017), Financial Access for U.S. Nonprofits, pp. 48–50.
63 See for example the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, http://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/home-page.html.
64 This risk has been highlighted by, among others, the former US Deputy Treasury Secretary and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and 
National Security Council Executive Secretary: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services (2016), Stopping Terror Finance: 
Securing the U.S. Financial Sector – Report Prepared by the Staff of the Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, Statement of Robert M. Kimmitt, 
p. 30, http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/terror_financing_report_12-20-2016.pdf.
65 Jones (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The UK Regulatory Environment, p. 10. See also the discussion of banks’ 
‘reputational return’ in Keatinge (2014).
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For banking restrictions to be reduced, humanitarian organizations and banks must deepen their 
engagement with each other, and states must play a far more active role on this issue at the national 
and international level. Solutions require the concerted efforts of all three sides.
Enhanced engagement between humanitarian actors and the banking sector
Banks’ reaction to increased scrutiny of their compliance with sanctions and counterterrorism 
measures, coupled with ‘derisking’, has been described as taking two forms: first, the adoption of 
necessary and proportionate measures to meet the real risk of funds reaching designated entities 
or targets; and, second, ‘seemingly irrational’ and disproportionate measures driven by a fear of 
regulators and a lack of familiarity with humanitarian organizations, their operations and their 
risk-management strategies.66 These approaches call for different responses by humanitarian 
organizations, banks and states.
Humanitarian actors must accept that the risk of funds reaching designated entities or persons does 
exist, and that it is incumbent upon them to respond to banks’ enhanced due diligence requirements. 
Dismissing them is neither a credible nor a feasible approach. This investment must become part of 
‘doing business’, even if it comes at a price in terms of increased staff time and additional personnel. 
The costs are significant for larger organizations, and can be prohibitive for smaller ones.67 Some 
humanitarian organizations have been reluctant to include these costs in funding proposals, out 
of concern that doing so would make their bids less competitive. They should not, however, shy 
away from including the costs in their funding requests to states: their inclusion will contribute 
to raising awareness of the extent of the problem, and may galvanize states into assisting banks 
and humanitarians to find mutually acceptable solutions.
This said, humanitarian actors’ frustration that the nature and volume of banks’ questions is 
often not commensurate with the risks, and frequently reflects a lack of familiarity with the sector, 
is understandable.68 The relationship between humanitarian organizations and banks must be 
developed – bilaterally and between the two sectors more generally. Where efforts have been made 
by management on both sides to engage and understand each other’s reservations, this has led to 
improved relationships and even to positive examples of cooperation – as, for instance, when a high-
street bank provided valuable assistance with the risk assessment of a planned cash programme.69
A process of mutual education must take place. Humanitarian organizations should invest the 
time to build their relationships with their banks to assist the latter to develop specialist knowledge 
of the humanitarian sector, its business model and its approach to risk mitigation. The conversation 
is already more mature, and there is already greater mutual awareness of respective concerns. 
Senior leadership on both sides should build on this to advance to the next stage of finding ways of 
striking the right balance in making banks’ requests relevant and effective, with the aim of reducing 
unwarranted restrictions on humanitarian organizations’ access to financial services.
66 Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on UK NGOs, p. 4.
67 See for example Center for Global Development (2015), Unintended Consequences of Anti-Money Laundering Policies for Poor Countries, 
Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-WG-Report-Unintended-Consequences-AML-
Policies-2015.pdf.
68 NGOs reported being asked questions about shareholders and owners, which are appropriate for corporate clients but not for humanitarian 
organizations. See Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on 
UK NGOs, p. 16.
69 Ibid., p. 21.
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In the UK, the British Bankers’ Association has played a valuable role in bringing together the banking 
sector, humanitarian actors and government. In 2013 it coordinated guidance on getting aid to Syria, 
and in 2014 it convened numerous meetings on Gaza and related fund transfer issues. In 2013 it made 
a submission to the FATF setting out a number of recommendations for states and regulators to ensure 
the continuation of payments for humanitarian action.70
Equally key in advancing the conversation is the systematic collection by humanitarian 
organizations of information on the requests they receive from banks, their responses and the 
time frame and outcome of the exchanges, as well as detailed data on the impact of banking-sector 
restrictions in terms of delays in receiving, accessing and disbursing funds, direct and indirect costs 
incurred as a result of the restrictions, and the impact on their operations. Some organizations have 
reservations about discussing difficulties in accessing financial services, as they fear this could cause 
reputational harm or dissuade potential donors.71 Data must therefore be collected and compiled 
in a manner that addresses these concerns. This information is essential for determining the nature 
and extent of the problem, and mobilizing all relevant stakeholders (banks, states, the FATF) 
to find ways of addressing the issue.72
The role of states
Nationally
As is the case in relation to sanctions and counterterrorism measures, states have a central role 
to play in alleviating the negative impact of banking-sector restrictions on humanitarian activity in 
different capacities, including as donors to humanitarian action, as ‘legislators’ and implementers of 
the regulatory framework, and as the ultimate supervisors of the banking sector and members of the 
FATF and other international financial forums. In respect of this issue, too, there is a need for greater 
cross-governmental coordination and coherence to reconcile competing priorities and activities.73
In their capacity as donors, states should encourage humanitarian organizations to include additional 
costs arising as a result of these restrictions in their funding proposals, and they should be willing to 
cover them. Equally importantly, they should also take a more active role, for example by engaging 
directly with the banking sector to explain the programmes they fund, and the requirements they 
include in funding agreements to reduce the risk of diversion or abuse.
Banking restrictions make humanitarian operations more expensive at best, and may significantly 
limit them. It is therefore in the interests of states as donors to humanitarian action to facilitate 
dialogue between humanitarian organizations and the financial sector to find solutions that address 
their mutual concerns. One way of doing this would be by establishing a forum to bring together 
humanitarian actors, banks and relevant government departments on a regular basis. For example, 
the UK has for some time planned to establish a cross-sectoral working group, chaired by the Home 
Office, with key government departments, humanitarian actors and the banking sector, to address 
the impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on the funding and delivery of humanitarian 
70 British Bankers’ Association, Disasters Emergency Committee and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (2013), Getting aid to Syria: Sanctions 
issues for banks and humanitarian agencies, December 2013, https://www.bba.org.uk/policy/financial-crime/sanctions-compliance/getting-aid-
to-syria.
71 Eckert et al (2017), Financial Access for U.S. Nonprofits, p. 76.
72 On the need for data, see ibid., pp. 36 and 54.
73 Jones (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The UK Regulatory Environment, p. 10.
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assistance, as well as on peacebuilding and development action.74 At the time of writing, the date 
of the first meeting was yet to be confirmed.
It is not for governments to micro-manage banks’ decisions, but policymakers can ‘set the 
tone from the top’.75 Derisking is unlikely to abate in the near term, unless pushed by supportive 
messaging by senior government officials publicly acknowledging and endorsing the work of 
humanitarian organizations.76
While states can facilitate dialogue and galvanize banks to provide services to humanitarian 
organizations at the national level, the problem is international in character. The nature of the 
banking system is such that a number of states are involved in transactions. This brings into play the 
regulatory systems of a number of countries. For example, banks providing services to UK-registered 
humanitarian organizations must comply not only with UK measures but also with those of a number 
of other states whose regulatory regimes are brought into play either by the nature of the transaction 
or through the extraterritorial application of a state’s laws.
US implementation of international and autonomous sanctions and counterterrorism measures is 
particularly influential, and the sanctions enforcement body OFAC plays a pivotal role in shaping 
not just US but also international banking behaviour. Among other things, this is due to the fact that 
US dollar-denominated transactions pass through the US, bringing the transaction within OFAC’s 
jurisdiction,77 even if both the sender and recipient are located elsewhere.
In view of this, creative cooperative solutions should be considered, such as approved channels 
for transmitting funds recognized by a number of states. Progress is only likely to occur if the issue 
is addressed by all states that play a key role in financial regulation. States with an interest in 
humanitarian action and influence in the financial world should initiate a discussion among peers.
The international dimension
At the international level, the FATF plays a central role in shaping the terrorist financing response 
of states and of the financial sector. After an initial, extremely damaging portrayal of the non-profit 
sector as a whole as ‘particularly vulnerable to abuse’, since 2013 the FATF has been engaging 
constructively with NGOs. This has led to the revision of Recommendation 8 and its Interpretive 
Note, and to the inclusion of a requirement that meetings with NGOs be held as part of the mutual 
evaluation process.78
The effect of this revision will take time to percolate into banks’ perceptions of the humanitarian 
sector. But the positive momentum it has generated must be maintained, and the adverse impact 
of banking-sector restrictions on humanitarian action kept on the FATF’s agenda. The current, fourth 
round of FATF evaluations is focusing on technical compliance and effectiveness, including in terms 
74 Ibid., p. 10 and Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions 
on UK NGOs, pp. 22–23. See also the UK Parliament record of written questions and answers from January 2017 regarding the working group 
and efforts to mitigate the effects of bank derisking: ‘Non-governmental Organisations: Written question – 60241’, http://www.parliament.
uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2017-01-17/60241/; and ‘Non-governmental 
Organisations: Financial Services: Written question – 60242’, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-question/Commons/2017-01-17/60242/.
75 Keatinge (2014), p. 67.
76 Keatinge and Keen (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of Banking Restrictions on UK NGOs, p. 25.
77 Ibid., p. 8.
78 This evolution is described in Romaniuk, P. and Keatinge, T. (2017, forthcoming), ‘Protecting charities from terrorists … and counter terrorists: 
FATF and the global effort to prevent terrorist financing though the non-profit sector’, Crime, Law and Social Change.
Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay Between Sanctions, 
Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action 
24 | Chatham House
of under- and over-compliance with FATF recommendations in the name of counterterrorism.79 
This is a valuable opportunity for humanitarian organizations to highlight the adverse impact 
of banking-sector restrictions, and could provide the necessary evidence to allow the FATF to 
issue guidance to the financial sector on how to avoid over-complying with the counterterrorism 
regulatory framework in a manner that has an undue impact on humanitarian action.80
In addition to the FATF, states should also consider raising the issue within the G20 in the context 
of the discussion on derisking. To date, the World Bank has not addressed this issue. States should 
bring it into the debate, as it could contribute to finding practical ways of transferring funds for 
humanitarian operations.
Finally, research so far has focused on the impact of banking restrictions on UK- and US-based 
humanitarian organizations. Additional work should be conducted to see how banks in other 
jurisdictions that are subject to similar regulatory frameworks have addressed this issue, and 
the nature and extent of the adverse impact of such restrictions on humanitarian organizations.
79 The evaluation of the US, which was completed in December 2016, flagged the challenges facing the non-profit sector, and encouraged the 
government to continue to work with such organizations and the private sector to find ways of striking the right balance between mitigating the 
real risks of terrorist financing and addressing banking challenges faces by some non-profit organizations. FATF (2016), Anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorist financing measures – United States, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, Paris: FATF, paras 233–34, www.fatf-gafi.org/
publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-united-states-2016.html.
80 Valuable discussions on non-profit engagement with the FATF are taking place, including under the aegis of the European Center for Not-
for-Profit Law and the Global NPO Coalition on FATF. See for example the report of the September 2016 meeting on Enhancing Effective 
Implementation of FATF Standards on Nonprofits, http://ecnl.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/FATF_Evaluations_Meeting_2016_Outcomes.pdf.
Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay Between Sanctions, 
Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action 
25 | Chatham House
6. The Way Forward
Prerequisites for progress
At this stage, there are three prerequisites for progress to occur. First, states are involved in this 
topic in a number of different capacities: they are donors to, and promoters of, humanitarian action; 
they adopt sanctions and counterterrorism measures at the international level; and they implement 
and enforce them through legislation at the national level. This means that several government 
departments are involved: typically, ministries of foreign affairs, home affairs, justice, finance, 
and overseas aid and development.81
All too frequently, however, these departments are not working on the different dimensions of this 
issue in a coordinated and coherent manner. Clashing government priorities can result in a lack 
of effective government ownership or consistent messaging. Therefore, ‘whole-of-government’ 
awareness of the issues and approaches must be developed to take account of and reconcile 
competing priorities and activities.82
Second, progress is unlikely to occur unless humanitarian actors find ways to provide empirical 
information on the actual adverse impact of the sanctions and counterterrorism on their operations. 
Prosecutions have been rare: most frequently, humanitarian organizations speak of a ‘chilling 
effect’ – a fear of violating the law, self-censoring, possibly over-complying.83 These arguments have 
been valuable in raising awareness of the problem, but they are no longer sufficient to advance 
the discourse.
Obtaining such information is notoriously challenging.84 Establishing clear causation between 
sanctions and counterterrorism measures and their impact on populations in need in situations 
of armed conflict is extremely difficult, as a range of other factors can also affect programme 
implementation. Those requesting information must accept this. But humanitarian organizations 
have been unable or reluctant to provide information that would give an idea of the nature and extent 
of the impact. There are a number of possible reasons for this: they may simply not be collecting 
the information, including because some may lack the capacity to do so; they may fear that sharing 
information might reveal that they are not fully complying with sanctions and counterterrorism 
measures – something that could pose an ‘existentialist reputational threat’; or some forms of adverse 
impact – such as the capacity to operate in accordance with humanitarian principles – may simply 
not be suited to quantification. The same lack of information exists in relation to the adverse impact 
of banking-sector restrictions, even though this is of a more quantifiable nature in terms of delays 
and increased costs. However, sensitivities to sharing such data also exist, as organizations fear that 
publicizing their problems may harm their reputation and lead to further difficulties with banks.
81 Jones (2017), Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The UK Regulatory Environment, p. 10.
82 See for example Chatham House, International Law Programme and International Security Department (2015), ‘UN Counterterrorism 
Legislation: Impact on Humanitarian, Peacebuilding and Development Action’.
83 See for example Mackintosh and Duplat (2013), Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action, p. 84.
84 See for example ibid., pp. 71ff.; and Burniske and Modirzadeh (2017), Pilot Empirical Survey Study on the Impact of Counterterrorism Measures 
on Humanitarian Action, p. 71.
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Ways must be found for humanitarian actors to collect and share information – in a manner 
that addresses reservations they may have in doing so – on the adverse impact of sanctions and 
counterterrorism measures. This should cover both the impact on operations and the costs of 
complying with the regulatory framework.85 In the absence of some evidence, states that are 
supportive of humanitarians’ position will be unable to champion it further. States that are 
reluctant to address the problem will have a convenient excuse for not doing so.
Third, the engagement between states and humanitarian actors is now more informed and mature. 
It must continue and become more transparent. To the extent possible, humanitarian actors should 
present a common position on what they consider the best way to advance the discourse and the 
specific measures they are willing to take to address the concerns of states and the financial sector.86
On their side, states should be more transparent about how the regulatory framework is 
being implemented in practice. For example, in relation to sanctions, they should provide more 
information on their responses to requests for licences: how many they have received; how many 
they have approved and how many rejected; and the grounds for their decisions. They should also 
provide information on minor infractions that they have not pursued. In the absence of case law, 
this will provide valuable guidance to humanitarian actors in understanding how the regulatory 
framework is being applied in practice, and it could also provide a degree of reassurance to the 
banking sector.
Recommendations
Sanctions
• UN Security Council sanctions should systematically include exemptions for 
humanitarian action.
• The potential adverse impact of sanctions on humanitarian action should be routinely brought 
to the attention of the Security Council and all UN member states.
• When it considers the imposition of sanctions the Security Council should, in consultation with 
humanitarian agencies and organizations, conduct an assessment of the possible adverse impact 
of the sanctions on humanitarian action. Once it has imposed sanctions, it should require panels 
of experts to conduct impact assessments on this issue and to report on them.
• Ways should be explored to establish an ongoing dialogue between the Security Council and 
humanitarian organizations on the country-specific impact of sanctions on humanitarian action.
• Arrangements should be established for sanctions committees and panels of experts to 
systematically consult humanitarian actors.
• The Security Council should systematically request sanctions committee panels of experts to 
include in their reports information on the adverse impact of sanctions on humanitarian action. 
If special representatives of the Secretary-General have been appointed for the contexts in which 
relevant sanctions have been imposed, the Security Council should also request them to provide 
such information in their periodic reports.
85 Burniske and Modirzadeh (2017), p. 73, suggest that empirical research be conducted into this second dimension.
86 Humanitarian actors’ ‘common voice’ on this issue remains elusive. See, most recently, ibid., pp. 78ff.
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• As is the case within governments in capital, states should ensure that all relevant experts 
within their permanent missions to the UN and other relevant intergovernmental organizations 
are aware of the potential adverse impact of sanctions on humanitarian action, and contribute 
to the elaboration of a coherent position that balances humanitarian needs with political and 
security concerns.
• States that are involved in the adoption of sanctions at the multilateral level – for example, 
Security Council members or EU member states in relation to EU sanctions – should consult 
humanitarian organizations on the possible adverse impact of sanctions on their operations 
before they are adopted. All states should do so once the sanctions are implemented nationally. 
Consultations should continue throughout the implementation of sanctions, so that any 
adverse consequences can be identified and brought to the attention of the international 
bodies responsible for the sanctions.
• The domestic implementation of UN and EU sanctions should be researched further, to 
determine, inter alia, whether states are entitled to include exemptions for humanitarian 
action in national implementing legislation in situations when these are not included in 
the international measures.
• The arrangements for obtaining licences, and, in the case of regional organizations such as 
the EU, the possibility for mutual recognition thereof, should be researched.
Counterterrorism measures
• The references in UN General Assembly resolutions to the need for counterterrorism measures 
not to impede humanitarian action should be retained and built on in future resolutions.
• The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force’s Working Group on Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism should address the impact of measures to counter terrorist financing on 
humanitarian action, in order to reflect the developments in the debates since its 2009 report 
and make recommendations that are relevant to the current situation. UN agencies, funds and 
programmes engaged in humanitarian action should endeavour to participate in this Working 
Group, to inject this dimension into the discussions.
• When adopting national measures criminalizing the provision of support to designated entities, 
states should include an express exception for humanitarian action.
• States should also frame offences of support to terrorism narrowly. They should follow the 
approach of the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, which criminalizes the provision of 
funds and other assets with the knowledge or intent that they will be used to commit an act 
of terrorism, rather than criminalizing support to a terrorist group more generally.
• States should consider establishing positions to exercise independent oversight over the 
application of counterterrorism measures.
The EU dimension
• EU sanctions should include exemptions for humanitarian action.
• Dialogue between the EU, its member states and humanitarian actors in relation to sanctions 
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should be built on with a view to making such engagement systematic both before the adoption 
of sanctions, and throughout their implementation.
• The approach adopted by the EU in relation to sanctions and counterterrorism measures should 
be the subject of further research and continued engagement by humanitarian actors.
Banking-sector restrictions
• Humanitarian organizations and banks should deepen their engagement with one another, 
and states should play a far more active role on this issue at the national and international level. 
Solutions require the concerted efforts of all three sets of actors.
• Humanitarian organizations should build their relationships with their banks to assist them 
to develop specialist knowledge of the humanitarian sector, its business model and its approach 
to risk mitigation.
• Humanitarian organizations should collect information on the requests they receive from 
banks, their responses, and the time frame and outcome of the exchanges, as well as detailed 
data on the impact of banking-sector restrictions, in terms of delays in receiving, accessing 
and disbursing funds, direct and indirect costs incurred as a result of the restrictions, and their 
impact on operations.
• Humanitarian organizations should include the increased costs of complying with banks’ due 
diligence requirements in their funding requests. States should be willing to cover these costs.
• Humanitarian organizations should continue to engage with the FATF. Advantage should 
be taken of the current, fourth round of FATF evaluations to highlight the adverse impact of 
banking-sector restrictions on humanitarian action.
• In their capacity as donors, states should take a more active role, for example, by engaging 
directly with the banking sector to explain the humanitarian programmes they fund, and the 
requirements they include in funding agreements to reduce the risk of diversion or abuse.
• States should facilitate regular dialogue between humanitarian organizations, the 
financial sector and relevant government departments to find solutions that address their 
mutual concerns.
• Senior government officials should publicly acknowledge and endorse the work of humanitarian 
organizations, with the aim of mitigating the effects of banks’ derisking.
• States with an interest in humanitarian action and with influence in the financial world should 
initiate a discussion among peers to consider creative cooperative solutions, such as approved 
‘safe channels’, recognized by a number of states, for transmitting funds.
• States should consider raising the issue within the G20, in the context of discussions on 
derisking. The World Bank should be brought into the debate to contribute to finding practical 
ways of transferring funds for humanitarian operations.
• Additional research should be conducted to see how banks in jurisdictions other than the 
UK and the US have addressed this issue, and the nature and extent of the adverse impact 
on humanitarian organizations.
Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay Between Sanctions, 
Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action 
29 | Chatham House
About the Author
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard is an associate fellow of the International Law Programme at Chatham 
House. She is also a senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, 
and a research fellow in the Individualisation of War project at the European University Institute.
Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay Between Sanctions, 
Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action 
30 | Chatham House
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the participants in two roundtable meetings, held under the Chatham 
House Rule, who gave generously of their time and provided valuable insights.
Thanks are also due to representatives of governments and inter- and non-governmental organizations 
who were unable to attend the meetings but who repeatedly provided valuable insights, and to 
external reviewers for their helpful comments on the draft paper.
The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author.
Chatham House is grateful to the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and to 
the Swiss Federal Department of Federal Affairs (Directorate for Political Affairs, Human Security 
Division) for their support.
Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay Between Sanctions, 
Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action 
31 | Chatham House
About the Chatham House Humanitarian Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups project
Chatham House has undertaken a study of certain factors that contribute to facilitating engagement with non-state 
armed groups (NSAGs) for humanitarian purposes. The initiative is intended to generate both political support and 
practical policy options in order to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian action in areas of conflict through 
improving engagement and interaction with NSAGs.
This paper concludes a series examining different aspects of the regulatory framework relevant to humanitarian 
action and NSAGs. Already published in 2017 are:
• Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The International Legal Framework, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard
• Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The UK Regulatory Environment, Kate Jones
• Humanitarian Action and Non-state Armed Groups: The Impact of UK Banking Restrictions on NGOs,  
Tom Keatinge and Florence Keen
In 2016 Chatham House published a series of five papers as part of the project:
• Towards a Principled Approach to Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups for Humanitarian Purposes,  
Michael Keating and Patricia Lewis
• Engaging Non-state Armed Groups for Humanitarian Purposes: Experience, Constraints and Ways Forward, 
Andrew MacLeod
• Engaging Armed Actors in Conflict Mediation: Consolidating Government and Non-governmental Approaches, 
Claudia Hofmann
• Improving Respect for International Humanitarian Law by Non-state Armed Groups, Ben Saul
• Eliciting the Voices of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Joshua Webb and Charu Lata Hogg
The Royal Institute of International Affairs 
Chatham House 
10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE 
T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710 
contact@chathamhouse.org www.chathamhouse.org
Charity Registration Number: 208223
Independent thinking since 1920
 
Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is an independent policy institute based 
in London. Our mission is to help build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by 
any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage 
or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all 
enquiries to the publishers.
Chatham House does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication 
are the responsibility of the author(s).
Copyright © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017
Cover image: The Muna camp in Maiduguri, Nigeria, for people displaced due to raiding by Boko Haram, 
on 12 May 2017.
Photo credit: Copyright © Koyodo News/Contributor/Getty
ISBN 978 1 78413 236 1
This publication is printed on recycled paper.
C
hatham
 H
ouse
